

Myth of a “Moderate” Fatah

**Can “strengthening” Mahmoud Abbas and his party
improve the situation in the Middle East?**

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The Myth of a “Moderate” Fatah

Arlene Kushner

There is a prevailing notion in Western diplomatic circles today that Hamas – and only Hamas – is the stumbling block to a successful negotiation of peace between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. According to this thinking, Fatah – and Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas in particular – are essentially “moderate” in outlook and should be strengthened in the interests of achieving that peace.

This approach cannot be substantiated, however, for in actuality Fatah is not “moderate” and would not sustain a genuine peace with Israel.

Statements offered to a Western world eager to embrace peace are cheap. They represent the major difference between Fatah and Hamas: While Hamas is boldly belligerent and declares its intentions outright, Fatah appears to play the game. But this difference is one of style and not of ultimate intentions.

A review of salient facts dispels the notion that Fatah is “moderate.”

The argument has been made that it was the influence of Arafat that caused Fatah to lack moderation, and that we are seeing a “new” Fatah since Arafat’s death. There is scant evidence to support this.

In the battle currently ensuing between Fatah and Hamas, is it reasonable – on the face of the evidence – to support and bolster Fatah with the expectation that it would genuinely pursue peace? The inescapable conclusion is that this is not a reasonable expectation.

We begin by looking at the Fatah of today, for this is of immediate concern.

We then turn to a broader look at Fatah, and a consideration of the years leading up to the present. No accurate understanding of Fatah would be possible without this perspective. What we find is that, while style may have changed, the essence of Fatah goals and policies have not. It is all of a piece.

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Fatah and Mahmoud Abbas since the Death of Arafat

Election Campaign

When Yasser Arafat died in November 2004, and Mahmoud Abbas (aka Abu Mazen) moved into position to replace him, common wisdom had it that a new, more moderate era had come. The evidence, however, indicates that, while Abbas dresses in a suit and conducts himself with a demeanor pleasing to Western diplomats, his actions – and the actions of the party he heads – tell a different story.

There were three positions that Arafat had held simultaneously prior to his death: chairman of the PLO, chairman of Fatah, and president of the PA. Abbas moved quickly into the first two positions and then proceeded to run in a major campaign for the third; the election was held January 9, 2005.

PA media expert Dr. Michael Widlanski in his study of the campaign for this election¹ documents clearly that neither Abbas himself nor his supporters within Fatah conveyed a message of moderation:

- In the period before the formal campaign began, Abbas traveled to Arab states – Syria, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states – to shore up support for his candidacy. In Syria he met with radical Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal. Within days of that visit, Hamas stepped up its attacks, but Abbas did not condemn them. Official Palestinian broadcast media – controlled by the PLO with Abbas at its head – referred to those who carried out the attacks as heroic martyrs.
- The campaign came out strongly for “right of return” for the refugees, a position that essentially advocates Israel’s destruction from within.
- While the Western media often gave the impression that Abbas was opposed to Palestinian violence, in fact, the media – particularly the PLO-controlled broadcast media – supported “resistance operations.” A key example: On December 13, 2004, two Palestinians blew up a tunnel that had been excavated under an Israeli border crossing checkpoint, killing five Israelis and wounding several more. They then shot at the Israeli rescue team that tried to save one of the soldiers. The official Palestinian Authority Radio newscast (Voice of Palestine) referred to this as an act of “heroic martyrdom.” The next day, the main anchorman for VOP Radio opened his broadcast by claiming that this had been a joint Hamas-Fatah operation.
- Abbas campaigned with leaders of Al-Aksa Martyrs Brigades, a military wing of Fatah (see more on this below) which has been designated by the United States Government as an FTO, a Foreign Terrorist Organization. At a rally in Jenin, he

publicly embraced Zakaria Zubeida, head of the Brigades in that city, wanted by Israel for direct involvement in suicide bombings. Hooded members of the Brigades were at the speaker's lectern. Abbas then prayed with Zubeida at a cemetery for people killed fighting Israel.

- Palestinian Authority broadcast media during the last week of December 2004 gave enormous coverage to the up-coming anniversary on January 1 of the "launching of the revolution" – Fatah's first official strike against Israel, aimed at the National Water Carrier, in 1965. Emphasis was placed on Abbas as leader of Fatah.
- Starting on December 27, 2004, the amount of anti-Israel material that was exhibited on the PLO broadcast media was stepped up. At this point some of the work of Palestinian cartoonist Omayya Jaha was featured. It included portrayals of Israelis as people who cook and eat Palestinian children.

Early Months of Abbas's Presidency

The motifs of Abbas's campaign set the tone for his administration following his January 9, 2005 election:

From the early months of his presidency he made it clear that he would not take on Hamas. When it was suggested that he dismantle terrorism, he responded, "I will not embark on an operation that will lead to a civil war."² His theme was "unity and cooperation" and he quickly began dialogue with Hamas and Islamic Jihad.

Within days of his election, it was announced that Abbas had ordered the police force in Gaza to prevent rockets from being fired into Israel. However, Sa'eb el-Ajez, head of the force, told *The Jerusalem Post* that while his men had been deployed in the area, they would not be involved in arresting terrorists, nor, he revealed, had there been an order for them to fire on those launching rockets.³ This is an instance of Abbas "giving the impression of" moderation, but not truly acting in accordance with this impression.

Incitement against Israel continued. Of particular note were the clergy in the hire of the PA who incited in their sermons, which were shown on official PA television. On February 4, 2005, Sheikh Ibrahim, Mudeiris gave a fiery sermon in which he said:

We tell you, Palestine, we shall return to you...to every grain of sand that was quenched by the blood of our grandparents...We might be able to use diplomacy to return to the 1967 borders, but we shall not be able to use diplomacy to return to the [whole land before Israel's existence]...the land of

*Palestine...will demand that the Palestinians will return the way Muhammad returned there, as a conqueror.*⁴

This sermon was shown on television less than a week after Abbas had promised to end broadcast incitement.

Abbas gave no order to revamp the PA produced textbooks, which are rife with incitement. See the full report on PA textbooks commissioned by the Israel Ministry of Defense and authored by Noa Meridor for the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center⁵; a summary can be found in Appendix I .

In mid-February Abbas approved the executions of three “collaborators.” These were people who had helped Israel locate terrorists, something the PA itself was supposed to be doing. This caused an enormous furor amongst human rights groups and put the final lie to any notion that Abbas was “moderate.” Abbas had tipped his hand in yet another way: Even though the courts had signed off on the executions (which required his signature), he consulted an Islamic court before proceeding.

On February 25, 2005, there was a major suicide bombing in Tel Aviv. All three PA newspapers, which were tightly monitored by Abbas and his aides, called this a “heroic martyrdom operation.”⁶

In mid-March Abbas met with a delegation of 13 terrorist groups in Cairo and invited them to come to Gaza after Israeli Prime Minister Sharon completed his pullout. In doing this he assured the creation of a terrorist entity at Israel’s border.

By late March he met with Hamas and Islamic Jihad and offered them the opportunity to join the PLO – without renouncing terrorism.

In early April he gave the order for the incorporation of wanted gunmen into the PA Security Forces. This was specifically to protect them from Israel; once they began collecting salaries, they had immunity. Before long, he was recruiting Hamas.

On July 23, two people were killed and four others wounded by Palestinian terrorists on the main road leading in to Gush Katif, near Kfar Darom. PA media expert Dr. Michael Widlanski reported at the time that the Voice of Palestine radio and Palestinian state television applauded the murder, calling it an act of “resistance” and “holy martyrdom,” and hinting that the murderers were carrying out their civic duty.

Abbas made a noteworthy public statement condemning the attack: He denounced it not in moral terms, but because it provides Israel with an “excuse” to launch attacks. The timing of the attack, he said, does not serve Palestinian interests.⁷ This means that if such an attack DID serve Palestinian interests, it would be OK.

This is part of a running pattern. Just two weeks earlier he had referred to a terrorist attack as “a crime against the Palestinian people [not the Israeli people].”⁸ When there was a major attack in Hadera in late October, he made the same comment about it harming the Palestinian people’s interests.

On August 4, 2005, Ahmed Qurei, then prime minister of the PA, and a prominent member of Fatah, gave a speech at a rally for Fatah in Gaza, in connection with the projected Israeli pullout from Gush Katif. He said:

*The process that was started in 1965 is now making its way, through the strong determination and will of our people, toward Jerusalem, the West Bank and the rest of the homeland.*⁹

What process was started in 1965? That was BEFORE Israel had Judea-Samaria, Gaza, and east Jerusalem – Israel was only within the Green Line. But that was when Fatah first went public regarding its attacks on Israel. Qurei was saying attacks on Israel within the Green Line would be continued.

On October 17, Al Aqsa Brigades, a military wing of Fatah, announced that efforts to “liberate the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Galilee would continue.” The Galilee is solidly within the Green Line.

In late October, the PA announced it would be spending \$1 million to redo the Mukata, the former headquarters of Yasser Arafat, complete with a memorial and a museum. This reflects an on-going veneration of the arch-terrorist Arafat – never has Abbas distanced himself from Arafat or suggested that his policies were mistaken.

In early November, a large group of PA (Fatah) security officers wrote a disgruntled letter to Abbas. They let it be known that they would not be cracking down on militant groups because Israel and the US wanted them to. They said they would use their weapons only against Israel and those collaborating with Israel.¹⁰

At the very end of November, the Middle East Newslite put out a report indicating that the IDF has “assessed that the ruling Fatah movement acquired and produced mortars for insurgency operations in the West Bank.”

On December 7, word broke in the PA paper *al-Haya al-Jadidha* that President Abbas had approved financial support for families of “martyrs.”

Leading up to and after the Hamas electoral victory

Whatever ambivalence was expressed within the PA regarding the decision of Hamas to run in the parliamentary elections of January 25, 2006, and whatever distress has been voiced by Abbas about the Hamas-run government since, the reality is that Hamas ran because of Abbas’s consistent policies of inclusion.

During the third week of October 2005, Abbas met with President Bush in Washington. At that time he told him that he would not be taking on the armed militias and would not be collecting weapons before the elections.

By the beginning of November, Abbas expressed distress with Israel’s objections to Hamas participation in the elections. He said that all were welcome to participate in the elections and suggested that “some parties don’t want the Palestinian democratic process to succeed.” Abbas had now equated the inclusion of Hamas with democratic process.

On January 25, 2006, election day (when results were not yet known), Nabil Sha'ath, PA deputy prime minister, said that terrorist groups would not be dismantled after the election.

Once the Hamas victory was apparent, two things transpired: There was an eruption of Fatah-Hamas violence and there was talk of a unity government forming. In considerable measure, this has set the tone for all that has transpired since.

It must be emphasized that Abbas’s chief concern has been the isolation of the PA by the international community in the wake of Hamas’s electoral success. International funds have been cut off and legitimacy is being denied the PA.

Thus Abbas’s chief concern was, and continues to be, establishment of an appearance of moderation within the PA sufficient to regain international approbation. Abbas has scant quarrel with its goals; it is Hamas’s style and methods that he takes issue with.

In mid-May, Al Aqsa Brigades, a branch of Fatah, threatened violence against the US and European nations if economic sanctions were sustained.

Abbas has for many months now swung between two poles: seeking to convince Hamas to establish a unity government with Fatah, and threatening to fire the government and call for early elections. Observers have noted that even as Abbas pontificates, he has moved steadily into a more radical stance. Hamas set a new, more belligerent tone and Abbas has adopted a “if you can’t beat them, join them” philosophy.

By late May, Abbas first alluded to a prisoners’ agreement, which he wanted to serve as the basis for Fatah-Hamas reconciliation. It had been cobbled together by a handful of prisoners in Israeli jails – most notably by Fatah leader Marwan Barghouti – and advocated freedom for all prisoners, “right of return,” and a Palestinian state based on pre-67 lines and established according to the Saudi proposal of 2002.

By early June, Fatah had established an-extra-official (i.e., illegal) militia of 2,500 gunmen, to counter the 3,000 gunmen of the illegal Hamas militia in Jenin.

In late June, Fatah and Hamas signed off on the Prisoners’ Document, in spite of Hamas’s earlier rejection of it. This was because Fatah had accepted changes in the document making it even more antithetical to peace than had been the case before. Fatah moved towards Hamas and not the other way around. Abbas had threatened to call a referendum if Hamas did not agree to the Document. But, as has become his style, he backed down from his threat.

The Document¹¹ that Mahmoud Abbas signed on behalf of Fatah:

Does not recognize Israel’s right to exist. (It talks about borders for a Palestinian state, but gives no recognition to what is on the other side of those borders.)

Does not talk about a final cessation of hostilities.

Sanctions terrorism (“the right of resistance by all means”) including within the Green Line.

Promotes “right of return.”

Abbas has bound himself to use this alone as the basis for political action – that is, he cannot proceed to negotiate with Israel on a more moderate basis.

Abbas's participation in sanctioning this document provides solid evidence that he is not a "moderate," not "a man of peace."

Also in late June, Fatah's Al Aqsa Brigades was directly involved in the kidnapping and murder of Eliyahu Asheri, an 18 year old yeshiva student; as it turned out, after they confessed to PA police, the police harbored them – the Al Aqsa murderers had PA police connections.

By early October evidence had surfaced of the involvement of Fatah's Al Aqsa Brigades in arming in Gaza. Abu Ahmed, of the Brigades, told WorldNetDaily¹² that Hezbollah, which has cells in the Sinai, was helping his group to train and to smuggle in weapons. Abu Ahmed particularly noted the work being done in Gaza on constructing bunkers for hiding weaponry, much as Hezbollah had used bunkers in Lebanon.

Violence between Fatah and Hamas gunmen has been substantial over the course of the past weeks, with numbers of persons killed and kidnapped on both sides. Always the violence stops short of civil war.

Popular wisdom has it that Abbas must be strengthened – that he is too weak to defeat to defeat Hamas or handle the other terrorist groups. Some very knowledgeable and credible political analysts see a different picture however; they believe he does not want to defeat Hamas or rein in the terrorists.

Political Analysts on Abbas's Lack of Will

Barry Rubin¹³ writes:

...Fatah is not going to stop terrorism, end incitement or be more moderate.

And why would anyone believe Fatah is capable of learning anything? Fatah is far more comfortable competing with Hamas in bragging about how militant it is, how many martyrs it has produced and how intently it will carry on the struggle to total victory.

Khaled Abu Toameh¹⁴ writes:

Abbas has control over at least 45,000 members of a dozen or so security forces in the Gaza Strip. This is in addition to thousands of gunmen and activists belonging to his Fatah party. Hamas, by contrast, has less than 5,000 militiamen, who are not as effective as Abbas's policemen and security agents, some of whom were trained by American and European security experts.

Here one needs to be reminded of the fact that although Hamas is in power, the Islamist movement actually has no control over the Fatah-affiliated

Palestinian security forces. Almost immediately after Hamas won the parliamentary election earlier this year, Abbas issued a "presidential decree," placing all the security forces under the jurisdiction of the "commander-in-chief" (who happens to be none other than Abbas himself)

WHY, THEN, doesn't Abbas simply order thousands of his policemen to deploy along the border with Israel to halt the Kassam attacks? How come he hasn't even made the slightest effort to stop the smuggling of tons of explosives from Egypt into the Gaza Strip?

The answer is simple. Abbas lacks the will - not the ability - to take harsh decisions. In fact, he appears to be comfortable with the image of the weak leader low on funds and resources. Abbas's message to the outside world is: If I only had more weapons, policemen and money, I'd be able to move against the terrorists...

Caroline Glick¹⁵ writes:

But if this week's bloody battles between Fatah and Hamas terrorists in Gaza show anything, they show that Abbas is anything but weak. When he wishes to confront Hamas he is more than capable of doing so. The reason peace has eluded us is not because Abbas is weak, but because he doesn't want peace with Israel...Far from the key to ending the Palestinian jihad against Israel, Abbas is part of the problem.

A Thumbnail Overview of Fatah

Founding

Fatah was founded in the 1950s in Kuwait by Yasser Arafat, along with a coterie of co-founders that included Mahmoud Abbas. In its early years it functioned in a clandestine fashion.

Its roots are radical: In organizing, Arafat drew on a group affiliated with the radical Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. What is more, Fatah had a strong connection to Algeria, which had just undergone a revolution utilizing a war of terror to boot out the French. Franz Fanon, the ideologue of that revolution, espoused the philosophy that violence was a catharsis for oppressed peoples and an end in itself.¹⁶

By 1968, Fatah had gained control of the PLO and has been a controlling force in that organization ever since. What is more, until the recent elections in which Hamas emerged victorious, Fatah controlled the Palestinian Authority as well.¹⁷

Fatah Spin-offs: Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades

In recent years, a number of militant militias have developed from the ranks of Fatah; these are groups that actively engage in terrorism. Key among these have been the Tanzim and Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades.

One of the purposes of these organizations has been to provide Fatah deniability with regard to terrorism. For this reason, the very real connections between them and Fatah has been obscured.

The Tanzim – which played a key role in fomenting the second Intifada – was founded by Arafat in 1995. Until his imprisonment by Israel, Marwan Barghouti, then Secretary-General of Fatah, served as its head.

Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, which first appeared in 2001, apparently came about as an off-shoot of the Tanzim. Barghouti was closely associated with this group as well, and according to some reports was its commander. It is responsible for some horrific terrorist attacks and was placed on the US list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on March 27th, 2002.

Documentation has been secured that solidly links the Al-Aqsa operation with Fatah:

During Operation Defensive Shield in 2002, the IDF found correspondence in the Mukata, Arafat's headquarters in Ramallah, from the Al-Aqsa Brigades to Fuad Shubaki, the PA procurement officer, requesting bombs and ammunition.¹⁸

Also confiscated were a request for \$2,500 to be disbursed to three named Al-Aqsa terrorists and a request for monetary aid for twelve known terrorists operating in Tulkarm; both requests had been signed by Arafat.¹⁹

Statements by persons connected with Fatah/Al Aqsa additionally confirm the connection:

Maslama Thabet, who was an Al-Aqsa leader in Tulkarm, told *US Today*:

*Our group is an integral part of Fatah. The truth is that we are Fatah itself, but we don't operate under the name of Fatah. We are the armed wing of the organization. We receive our instructions from Fatah. Our commander is Yasser Arafat himself.*²⁰

In June 2004, then PA Prime Minister Ahmed Qurei told the London-based *Asharq al-Awsat* newspaper:

*We have clearly declared that the Aksa Martyrs Brigades are part of Fatah. We are committed to them and Fatah bears full responsibility for the group.*²¹

The documented connection between Fatah and Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades in and of itself puts the lie to any notion of Fatah moderation.

The Fatah Constitution

See <http://www.acpr.org.il/resources/fatehconstitution.html> for an English translation of the Fatah constitution.

This is a document that stands today. It defines Zionism as a colonial, aggressive invasion and calls for the complete liberation of Palestine via armed revolution.²²

Fatah Connection to PLO policy

Fatah-PLO Connection

For all intents and purposes, Fatah and the PLO are synonymous, as Fatah has been and remains the controlling party of the PLO. Decisions made by the PLO are endorsed, if not actively promoted, by Fatah. For many years it was Yasser Arafat who chaired both organizations; since Arafat's death, it is Mahmoud Abbas who holds both positions.

Phased Program

In 1974, the PLO adopted its "Phased Program,"²³ which has never been abrogated or repealed and continues to represent PLO policy. This policy states:

Any liberation step that is achieved constitutes a step for continuing to achieve the PLO strategy...for completing the liberation of all of Palestinian soil.

The PLO recognized that Israel cannot be destroyed in a war, and moved to a strategy of accomplishing this goal one step at a time. Whatever land can be acquired will be taken, and used as a foothold for further action, until Israel has been vanquished.

In recent years, PLO leaders have reiterated the existence of this policy. In 1996, Nabil Sha'ath (an active member of both Fatah and the PLO) said:

*We decided to liberate our homeland step-by-step...*²⁴

In 2001, Faisal Hussein (active in both Fatah and the PLO) said:

*...we are asking all the Palestinian forces and factions to look at the Oslo Agreement and at other agreements as 'temporary' procedures or phased goals...our ultimate goal is the liberation of all historical Palestine...*²⁵

Duplicity – a pretense of a moderation that does not exist – is implicit within this policy. Willingness to accept a state now on less than all of "Palestine" does not signal genuine acceptance of a two-state solution.

It is deemed permissible to break treaties with non-Muslim adversaries.²⁶ It is imperative to recognize this if the policies and goals of Fatah are to be understood.

The PLO Charter

In spite of considerable public relations hoopla to the contrary, the PLO Charter (Covenant) clauses that call for the elimination of Israel have never been removed.

On September 9, 1993, Yasser Arafat, in a letter to Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, committed himself to amending articles in the Covenant that denied Israel's right to exist. On April 24, 1996, the Palestinian National Council convened in Gaza and adopted a resolution empowering a committee with the task of redrafting the Charter. But this declared intention in and of itself did not change the document; in fact, the resolution did not even refer to the specific wording that had to be amended.²⁷

The committee empowered with making the changes never met.

See <http://www.netaxs.com/~iris/plochart.htm> for an English translation of the official PLO Charter, drafted in 1968.

The PLO/PA Link to Hamas before 2004

Links between Fatah, as part of the PA, and Hamas, have been more solid than most realize. Less than a year after the signing of Oslo, which called for a renunciation of violence, Jabil Rajoub (Fatah), then head of the PA Preventative Security Service in the West Bank, said:

*We sanctify the weapons found in the possession of the national factions [primarily Hamas], which are directed against the occupation...*²⁸

Just months later, Nabil Sha'ath (Fatah), who was a member of the Palestinian Legislative Council, said:

*...we have a political relationship with Hamas, a brotherly relationship.*²⁹

In 1995, a formal pact was established between the PA and Hamas.³⁰ While Fatah (as the PA) presented a façade of peacefulness, this pact makes it clear that it endorsed terrorism. It condoned continued Hamas terror attacks against Israel launched from outside of PA controlled areas (to spare the PA embarrassment); called for the cessation of all PA preventative security actions against Hamas, and pledged that the PA would release all Hamas prisoners.³¹

Background of Mahmoud Abbas (aka Abu Mazen)

With Yasser Arafat, Mahmoud Abbas helped to found Fatah in the 1950s, and then remained Arafat's protégé for many years: he learned at Arafat's side, was privy to all of Arafat's major decisions, and lent assistance in terrorist activities. In no way should he be considered outside of what went on during those years.

He has been specifically linked to two terrorist attacks; one of these was the Ma'alot Massacre of 1973, in which 22 children were killed.

The other was his association with the slaughter of Israeli athletes at the Olympics in Munich in 1972. Mohammed Daoud Oudeh, the mastermind of this attack, in his memoirs, *Palestine: From Jerusalem to Munich*, identified Mahmoud Abbas as the one who secured the funding.

In the early 1980s, he secured his doctorate at Oriental College, in Moscow. His thesis, written in Russian, had suggestions of Holocaust denial. This thesis was then turned into a book, *The Other Side: The Secret Relationship between Nazism and the Zionist Movement*, written in Arabic. At this point, Abbas added new material denying historical data on the Holocaust and delegitimizing Zionism.³²

At the time that the Oslo process came into being, he appeared to be a moderate, as he helped behind the scenes to bring it to fruition.

However, Yossi Beilin, who worked with Abbas during this period, said Abbas was "among Arafat's restrictors during the Camp David summit." Beilin believed that Abbas's position was more extreme than Arafat's as he kept Arafat from compromising.³³

APPENDIX I: Summary of a Report on PA Textbooks

In the school year 2004-2005, the Palestinian Authority published 29 new textbooks for the fifth and tenth grades. All are still in use.

In April 2006, the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center released a report by Noa Meridor that examines these books. The report focused on the PA attitudes reflected in the books with regard to the State of Israel, the Zionist Movement and the Jewish People.

Noa Meridor is a researcher in the Israeli Defense Ministry office of the Coordinator of the Israeli Government Activities in the Territories.

Summary of her finding follows here.

A review of the texts indicates a consistent, long-standing negative attitude...towards the State of Israel, the Zionist movement, and the Jewish people.

❑ The existence the State of Israel is conspicuously ignored. Israel does not appear on maps, and when it does appear in written texts, it is only in negative contexts. The agreements achieved between the Palestinians and Israel are not mentioned. A strong emphasis is placed on the “Israeli occupation” and settlements in the “territories”, portrayed as part of the phenomenon of global imperialism, coveting the lands of the weak.

❑ To undermine the ideological foundation of the Zionist movement, the book authors keep ignoring the Israeli people’s profound historic connection with the Land of Israel. They do so by almost completely disregarding the ancient Jewish presence in the Land of Israel, and by defining the ancient inhabitants of the region as Arab peoples. As for the Palestinians’ attitude towards Israel, the books, as in the past, deal with war, violent confrontation, what they refer to as “the martyrdom of the Palestinian warriors”, and the refugees’ “right of return” to those places in Israel they left.

❑ An innovation of grave significance found in one of the 2004-2005 textbooks is the use of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion as a means to besmirch the Zionist movement, reiterating anti-Semitic myths on the Jews’ intention to take over the entire world...Furthermore, even though the subject of World War II and its consequences is covered in one of the textbooks, its authors chose to totally ignore the Holocaust.

❑ In the previous year (2003-2004), a positive change was observed in the textbooks, which indicated the Green Line and mentioned the agreements

between the Palestinians and Israel. The 2004-2005 textbooks, however, show a regression, which is reflected **in ignoring the agreements between Israel and the Palestinians and in renewing the practice of referring to population centers in Israel proper (within its pre-1967 borders) as “settlements” (the purpose being to portray them as illegitimate and temporary)**. Moreover, the textbooks also make use of **anti-Semitic motifs** as a means to attack the Zionist movement.

□ These negative findings are characteristic of the **Palestinian curriculum**, based on an **educational policy striving to indoctrinate the young generation of Palestinians with hatred against the State of Israel**. It is reflected in the denial of Israel’s legitimacy, unwillingness to peacefully coexist with it, cultivation of hostility against Israel (and against the Jews, albeit to a lesser extent), attempt to refute the connection between the Jewish people and the Land of Israel by rewriting history, and inculcation of the concept of violent struggle as a positive national and religious value. This “education”, conducted in the Palestinian Authority’s education institutions, **gives rise to new generations of students instilled with hatred against Israel, making peaceful coexistence between the two peoples highly difficult to achieve**.

For the full report see:

www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam.multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/as_nm_e.pdf

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- ¹ Making of the President 2005, available at <http://israelbehindthenews.com/pdf/PalPresident.pdf>
- ² Israel Resource Review, April 1, 2005.
- ³ See The Daily Alert for January 20, 2005.
- ⁴ Translation: Palestinian Media Watch.
- ⁵ www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam.multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/as_nm_e.pdf
- ⁶ Front Page Magazine, March 4, 2005.
- ⁷ *The Jerusalem Post*, July 24, 2006.
- ⁸ *The New York Times*, July 13, 2005.
- ⁹ *The Jerusalem Post*.
- ¹⁰ Khaled Abu Toameh, *The Jerusalem Post*, November 10, 2005.
- ¹¹ Full text can be found at http://blog.onevoicemovement.org/one_voice/2006/05/text_of_palesti.html
- ¹² Aaron Klein, WorldNetDaily, October 2, 2006.
- ¹³ Barry Rubin, "The Region: Time for RealPolitik," *The Jerusalem Post*, October 23, 2006.
- ¹⁴ Khaled Abu Toameh, "Palestinian Affairs: Guns and Poses," *The Jerusalem Post*, November 23, 2006.
- ¹⁵ Caroline B. Glick, "Column One: Privatizing the War," *The Jerusalem Post*, December 22, 2006.
- ¹⁶ According to the International Policy Center for Counter-Terrorism, an early Fatah leaflet was essentially a collection of quotations from a book by Fanon.
- ¹⁷ The Palestine Liberation Organization is an umbrella organization that has self-identified as the representative of Palestinians the world over; it is the PLO that is presumably charged with negotiations. The Palestinian Authority is an administrative entity (conceived of as temporary at the time of its founding in 1994) that was to operate only in Palestinian Arab areas of Judea-Samaria and in Gaza. Until 2006, the PA consisted in the main of persons who were PLO-Fatah affiliated.
- ¹⁸ According to the Institute for Counterterrorism, an invoice, dated September 16, 2001, included numerous handwritten notes. The cost of each bomb was listed as \$150. One note said "We require on a weekly basis 5-9 explosives charges for squads in various areas." www.ict.org.il
- ¹⁹ Matthew Levitt and Seth Wikas, "Defensive Shield Counterterrorism Accomplishments, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 17, 2002.
- ²⁰ Matthew Kalman, "Terrorist says orders come from Arafat, *US Today*, March 16, 2002.
- ²¹ Khaled Abu Toameh, "Fatah committed to Aksa Martyrs," *The Jerusalem Post*, June 20, 2004

²² Among its principles:

UN projects, accords and resolutions... which undermine the Palestinian people's right in their homeland are illegal and rejected.

The Zionist Movement is racial, colonial and aggressive in ideology...

The Israeli existence in Palestine is a Zionist invasion with a colonial expansive base...

Liberating Palestine and protecting its holy places is an Arab, religious and human obligation.

Among its goals:

Complete liberation of Palestine, and eradication of Zionist economic, political, military and cultural existence.

Among its methods:

Armed public revolution is the inevitable method to liberating Palestine.

Armed struggle is a strategy and not a tactic, and the Palestinian Arab People's armed revolution is a decisive factor in the liberation fight and in uprooting the Zionist existence, and this struggle will not cease unless the Zionist state is demolished and Palestine is completely liberated.

²³ Adopted at the 12th Session of the Palestinian National Council, Cairo, June 9, 1974.

²⁴ www.middleeastfacts.com/quotes.html

²⁵ MEMRI Dispatch # 236

²⁶ This is sanctioned within Muslim law, and is known as *hila*m – “by stratagems you will make war.” The model for this approach is Muhammad, who broke a peace treaty with a polytheistic tribe when the time was ripe for attack.

For further information, see Daniel Pipes, “Lessons from the Prophet Muhammad’s Diplomacy, *Middle East Quarterly*, September 1999.

²⁷ Confusion resulted because of conflicting messages subsequently put out by various members of the PLO. PLO Chair Arafat sent letters to Present Clinton and Prime Minister Blair purporting to explain which articles of the charter had been modified, but the two letters listed different articles.

²⁸ *Yediot Ahronot*, May 27, 1994.

²⁹ Reuters, October 28, 1994.

³⁰ Published in the Egyptian *Al-Ahram Weekly* on September 20, 1995.

³¹ Yigal Carmon, now head of MEMRI confirmed these details. See www.io.com/~jewishwb/iris/archives/451.html

³² Yigal Carmon, MEMRI.

³³ Dan Scheuftan in *Yediot Ahronot*, March 11, 2002.